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Abstract 
From 2012-2017 more than 5000MW of coal plant exited Australia’s National 
Electricity Market (NEM).  The average plant exit notice period was 5.2 months.  Exit 
at scale peaked just as imbalances in the market for natural gas emerged.  
Compounding matters were Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) plant entry lags due 
to policy discontinuity in prior periods.  By 2016/17, the culmination of coal plant 
exit, gas market imbalances and VRE entry lags produced more than 20 Lack of 
Reserve events across the NEM, three blackouts including a black system event in the 
South Australian region.  Spot and forward electricity prices rose to record levels, 
viz. $90-$130/MWh compared to an historic average of $42.50.  In this article, the 
lead-up to these abnormal trading conditions are traced back to policy decisions a 
decade earlier in the markets for electricity, natural gas and renewable energy.  
Lessons for other energy markets undergoing transformation include i). transparency 
over lumpy plant exit decisions, ii). climate change policy stability, and iii). clear 
policy limits to gas export capacity vis-à-vis domestic supply. 
 
Keywords:  Resource Adequacy, Climate Change Policy, Electricity Prices.   
JEL Codes: D61, L94, L11 and Q40. 
 
1. Introduction 
From 1998-2016, Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) had been a beacon for 
policymakers seeking to reform an electricity sector.  The NEM was unique amongst 
restructured electricity market designs due to its single, real-time platform comprising a 
mandatory “gross pool” spot electricity market and eight co-optimised Frequency Control 
Ancillary Service spot markets, operating across five imperfectly interconnected regions with 
5-minute dispatch resolution (MacGill, 2010).  A single Independent Market Operator 
coordinates all regions and all spot markets, and again somewhat uniquely, without any 
formal day-ahead market1 or capacity market (Riesz et al. 2015).  Forward derivative 
contracts are traded both on-exchange and Over-The-Counter (OTC) and have historically 
exhibited turnover of 300-400% of physical trade.2  
 
The governance framework is also unique; system operations, market regulation, and market 
rulemaking/policymaking are strictly segregated between the Australian Energy Market 
Operator; Australian Energy Regulator and Australian Energy Market Commission3, 
respectively.  Above all, the NEM’s gross pool uniform first-price auction clearing 
mechanism and associated forward markets have delivered consistent economic performance 
under a wide range of technical and economic conditions, with Resource Adequacy (i.e. 
reliability) and security of supply being maintained with very few exceptions (see Appendix 
I). 
 
In 2016/17 power system conditions deteriorated.  The combination of events culminating 
over prior periods was extraordinary by any standard; the progressive closure of 18% of the 
NEM’s coal fired generators, a domestic gas market that simultaneously went into an export-
driven deficit, rebounding energy demand following five years of decline, an absence of new 
                                                          
 Professor of Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University.  Views expressed in this article are those of the author.   
 Associate, Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge. 
1 Although as MacGill (2010) points out, the Market Operator does produce a very transparent 40hr pre-dispatch forecast which 
is continuously updated. 
2 See Simshauser, Tian & Whish-Wilson (2015) and in particular Appendix III. 
3 The Australian Energy Market Commission is in turn accountable to “COAG Energy Council” – which comprises the Energy 
Ministers from the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments. 
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gas-fired proposals (let alone new entrants) and renewable plant entry lags due to policy 
discontinuity.   
 
As a result of this confluence of events, during 2016/17 the market operator issued more than 
20 Lack of Reserve notices4 while the South Australian (SA) region experienced three major 
blackouts including a total grid collapse – Australia’s first black system event since the early 
1960s.  Base load electricity futures rose to AUD $90-130/MWh5 – well above the NEM’s 
long run average spot price of $42.50/MWh.  And short- to medium-term gas contracts were 
$9-12+/GJ after having progressively increased from historical long run equilibrium prices of 
$3-4/GJ as Figure 14 later reveals.  The 2017/18 summer was expected to result in more 
supply shortages.  From a consumer perspective this was an energy market in crisis and was 
treated as such by policymakers.  The requisite “Inquiry” followed6, along with expectations 
that something must be done as Helm (2014, p.4) explains more generally of energy markets 
and politically-driven Inquiries. 
 
The purpose of this article is to analyse how Australia’s NEM deteriorated so quickly, and to 
draw out policy implications for energy markets.  It takes close to a decade to create such a 
mess, and so the analysis that follows necessarily covers a 10-year window.  This article is 
structured as follows:  Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on energy-only 
electricity markets.  Section 3 analyses the 2009-2015 period leading up to the energy market 
crisis while Section 4 analyses the unfolding events from 2016-2017.  Policy implications and 
conclusions follow. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
In the context of the current analysis, two particular strands of literature are relevant, (i) 
Resource Adequacy in energy-only markets, and (ii) carbon policy uncertainty in Australia. 
 
2.1 Resource Adequacy in energy-only markets 
Resource Adequacy in energy-only markets can be loosely traced back to von der Fehr and 
Harbord (1995), who noted certain characteristics made merchant generation investment 
unusually risky, viz. indivisibility of plant capacity, long construction lead-times, lumpy plant 
entry, investment tenor and policy uncertainty (see also Stoft, 2002; Bidwell & Henney, 2004 
and others7).  Entire editions of academic journals have been devoted to the topic.8  Doorman 
(2000), De Vries (2002) and Stoft (2002) were early contributors vis-à-vis the risk of peak 
plant investment while Peluchon (2003), Roques et al. (2005), Hogan (2005), Cramton & 
Stoft (2006), Joskow (2006), Finon & Pignon (2008), Simshauser (2008), Finon (2008) 
catalogue risks to timely entry across Europe, USA and Australia.   
 
In theory, energy-only markets clear demand reliably and provide timely investment signals 
for requisite new capacity (Schweppe et al. 1988).  But energy-only market theories are based 
upon equilibrium analysis and in practice electricity markets (like other markets) can be off 
equilibrium for extended periods (de Vries & Heijien, 2008; Hirth et al. 2016).  What makes 
electricity markets of special interest is 1). the capital-intensive nature of the plant stock 
required to clear largely inelastic demand and the implications for capital flows under 
disequilibrium, and 2). the essential service nature of the commodity and the political 
economy associated with supply-side shortages.   
 
A long list of explicit and implicit assumptions underpin the energy-only market model – 
including unlimited market price caps, limited political & regulatory interference, active 
demand-side participation, perfect forward markets or in the absence of these, a largely equity 
capital-funded generation fleet able to withstand elongated price cycles.  But as these 
                                                          
4 See ESB (2018). 
5 All financials are expressed in Australian Dollars (AUD) unless otherwise indicated. 
6 The initial response from COAG Energy Council was the establishment of the Finkel Review. 
7 See also Neuhoff et al. 2004; de Vries et al. 2004; Wen et al. 2004; Hogan, 2005; Bushnell, 2005; Roques et al. 2005; Cramton 
and Stoft, 2006; Joskow, 2006; Simshauser, 2008; Finon, 2008, 2011; Hogan 2013; Cramton, Ockenfels & Stoft, 2013; and 
Spees et al. 2013. 
8 See for example Utilities Policy Volume 16 (2008) and Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy Volume 2 (2013). 
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assumptions are progressively relaxed and market frictions introduced, it can be shown 
energy-only markets with an administratively determined Value of Lost Load (VoLL) do not 
have a stable equilibrium (Bidwell & Henney, 2004; Roques, 2008; Simshauser, 2008).  
Given substantial sunk costs and low marginal running costs, persistent generator bidding at 
marginal cost in an intensely competitive energy-only market will produce inadequate net 
revenues – known as the missing money problem (Cramton & Stoft, 20069).  Participants in 
energy-only markets are unable to optimise the number of blackout events (i.e. VoLL) that 
produce stable equilibrium (Cramton et al. 2013), while in addition wholesale price caps can 
be set too low or over-enforced by regulatory authorities along with actions by System 
Operators which suppress legitimate price signals (Joskow 2008, Spees et al., 2013; Hogan, 
2013, Leautier, 2016 and others10).    
 
Furthermore, electricity markets are characterised by several non-trivial market failures.  
Most hard and soft commodity markets clear under scarcity conditions via a combination of 
demand-bids and supply-inventories.  But in electricity markets, large segments of real-time 
aggregate demand are price-inelastic and unable to react to scarcity conditions (Cramton & 
Stoft, 2008, Batlle & Perez-Arriaga, 2008; Roques, 2008; Finon & Pignon, 2008).  The 
supply-side is similarly inelastic in real-time because storage is costly.  System Operators 
must therefore resort to non-price rationing and a regulator is forced to administratively 
determine VoLL.  
 
High levels of Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) amplifies and complicates matters, because 
historically such plant have been subsidised in certificate ‘side-markets’ and priority 
dispatched (Nelson et al. 2012; Joskow, 2013; Newbery, 2015; Simshauser, 2018).  Given 
negligible marginal running costs, merit-order effects arising from VRE became apparent in 
markets such as Germany as early as 2008 (Sensfuβ et al. 2008) and had been prominent in 
the SA region of the NEM (Forrest and MacGill (2013; Cludius et al. 2014; Bell et al. 2015; 
Bell et al. 2017).   
 
Energy-only markets are thus rarely in equilibrium, and this matters because capital-intensive 
merchant generators face rigid debt repayment schedules.  Of itself, this is unremarkable but 
becomes problematic in the presence of incomplete forward derivatives markets.  In 
consequence, the theory of energy-only markets suffers from an inadequate treatment of how 
sunk capital is financed (Joskow, 2006; Finon, 2008; Meade & O’Connor, 2009; Caplan, 
2012; Nelson & Simshauser, 2013). 
 
Energy-only markets have generally failed to deliver the requisite mix of derivative 
instruments required to facilitate efficient plant entry (Hansen, 2004; Chao, Oren and Wilson, 
2008; Meade and O’Connor, 2009; Meyer, 2012).  As Finon (2011) explains, the canonical 
model in deregulated energy-only markets was the Merchant Power Producer, a stand-alone 
generator that sold its production into spot and short-term forward markets, underpinned by 
long-dated non-recourse project finance. In the early phases of the global restructuring and 
deregulation experiment, a vast fleet of merchant plant was banked on this basis (Joskow, 
2006; Finon, 2008).11  But recurring economic damage to merchant generator Profit & Loss 
Statements, a product of missing money, began to take its toll on project bank risk tolerances 
and credit metrics (Simshauser, 2010).  By 2005 more than 110,000MW of merchant plant in 
the US, much of the Australian merchant fleet and some high profile plant in the UK (e.g. 
Drax) experienced financial distress or bankruptcy (Joskow, 2006; Finon, 2008; Nelson & 
Simshauser, 2013).  Consequently, the canonical model became un-bankable on a timely 
basis in the absence of long-term (i.e. 10+ years) contracts.  There is now considerable 
evidence to support the notion that timely plant entry on a purely merchant basis is 
                                                          
9 See also Neuhoff et al. 2004; de Vries, 2004; de Vries et al. 2008; Bushnell, 2005; Roques et al. 2005; Joskow, 2008b; Finon, 
2008; Simshauser, 2008; Joskow, 2013; Nelson & Simshauser, 2013; Cramton, Ockenfels & Stoft, 2013; Green & Staffell, 2016; 
Keay, 2016.   
10 See also Besser et al. 2002; Oren, 2003;de Vries, 2003; Wen et al. 2004; Batlle & Perez-Arriaga, 2008; Finon & Pignon, 2008. 
11 This included 230,000MW in the US, 13,000MW in Australia and more than 6000MW of new plant in the UK.  See Joskow 
(2006), Finon (2008) and Simshauser (2010) for details.  
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intractable12 in energy-only markets (Joskow, 2006; Howell, Meade & O’Connor, 2010; 
Caplan, 2012; Nelson and Simshauser, 2013).   
 
Long-dated contracts have become a pre-condition for project finance, and while Australia’s 
NEM is noted for favourable forward market liquidity13, activity spans 3 years – well short of 
optimal financing that facilitate efficient ex-ante investment commitment, viz. 12-year semi-
permanent project debt set within notional 18-25 year structures.  Forward markets have 
failed to calibrate beyond 3 years because competitive Retailers cannot afford to hold hedge 
portfolios dominated by inflexible long-dated contracts when large components of their 
customer book switch supplier every 2-3 years.  As Figure 11 later illustrates, Commercial & 
Industrial customers in the NEM had signed, on average, contracts of just 22 months duration 
just prior to the NEM’s looming price cycle.  The short-tenor bias of merchant retailers can be 
traced to excessive retail-level competition, demand uncertainty and risks of being undercut 
by new entrant retailers with short-dated portfolios (Newbery, 2006 and others14).  
 
Three broad remedies are typically suggested to deal with missing money viz. (1) introducing 
capacity markets (Bidwell & Henney, 2004; Simshauser, 2008; Spees et al. 2013; Green & 
Staffell, 2016), (2) raising VoLL (Newbery, 2006; Finon, 2008; Simshauser, 2010), or (3) 
increasing Operating Reserves (Hogan, 2005; 2013).  Each of these comes with problems; 
introducing capacity markets represents a partial reversion to central planning and grinds 
against the decision to push market and investment risk away from consumers and to 
investors in the first place (Leautier, 2016).15  Raising VoLL compounds the risk of, and 
inability to distinguish, market power (Roques et al, 2005 and others16).  And increasing 
Operating Reserves, which has the effect of expanding volumes and increasing the frequency 
of ‘lower value VoLL events’, may suffer similar problems. To be sure, none of these 
represent a choice between markets and intervention because each involve an 
administratively-determined variable (Campton et al. 2013).17 
 
2.2 Australian carbon price policy discontinuity  
While Australia’s energy-only NEM operated successfully for the better part of two decades 
(noting Australia’s very high VoLL of $14,200/MWh), this occurred in spite of climate 
change policy settings.  Indeed a “two-decades long” climate change policy war, which 
commenced in 199718, has persisted between Australia’s two major parties, the social 
democratic Labor and conservative Liberal / National coalition, and, within the conservative 
Liberal party (see Jones, 2009; Nelson et al. 2010; Jones, 2010; Byrne et al 2013; Molyneaux 
et al 2013; Nelson et al, 2013; Byrne et al. 2013; Freebairn, 2014; Garnaut, 2014; Wagner et 
al. 2015; Nelson 2015; Apergis & Lau, 2015).   
 
There have been seven attempts at a national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) over the 
period 1997-2018.  ETS policy development cycles were initiated in 1997-2001 (see AGO, 
                                                          
12 To be clear, plant will eventually enter on a merchant basis if prices are high enough.  But the political economy of such prices 
makes this problematic. 
13 See for example Chester (2006); Anderson et al. (2007); Howell, Meade & O’Connor (2010); and most recently, Simshauser et 
al. (2015, Appendix 3 and Figure C.1 on p.54). 
14 See also Green, 2006; Anderson et al. 2007; Finon, 2008; Simshauser, 2010; Howell, Meade and O’Connor, 2010 
15 Hogan (2013) also notes there is no simple way to observe and measure delivery.  Conversely, Cramton & Stoft (2008) 
observe that even if capacity is overbuilt as a result of capacity mechanisms, the incremental cost to consumers is small because 
excess ‘peaking plant’ is the cheapest form of capacity (viz. an extra 10% of peak capacity may increase consumer costs by say 
2%).  Additionally, Spees et al. (2013 pp15-16) observe that on balance capacity markets in the US have delivered good results 
in that they met their objective function, mobilised large amounts of low cost supply including Demand Response, energy 
efficiency, transmission interconnection, plant upgrades, deferred retirements and environmental retrofits.  
16 See also Besser et al, 2003; Oren, 2003; Cramton & Stoft, 2006; Joskow 2008; Simshauser, 2008. 
17 A higher VoLL involves administratively determining a price cap to meet an administratively-determined reliability constraint.  
As Joskow (2013) notes, the entire logic of capacity markets starts with administratively-determined reliability criteria and 
involves administratively determining the quantity required to meet that constraint.  And relying on FCAS involves 
administratively determining spinning reserve quantities in order to meet the reliability constraint.  Thus each solution involves 
some form of administrative judgement, and in all cases, the risk of error – viz. exercise of market power with VoLL (Hogan, 
2013); over-investment with capacity markets (Leautier, 2016); or market power and excess reserves with FCAS – is ultimately 
borne by the customer.     
18 The Howard Government released a broad climate policy strategy titled “Safeguarding the Future: Australia’s Response to 
Climate Change.  See Parliament of Australia at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query%3DId%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1997-11-
20%2F0016%22 – accessed August 2017). 
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1999a, 1999b; Nelson et al. 2010; Simshauser & Tiernan 2018), in 2005-2006 via a state-
based national ETS scheme (see NETT, 2006; Nelson et al. 2010; Jones, 2014) and again 
from 2008-2010 (see Buckman & Diesendorf, 2010; Garnaut, 2014).  On the fourth attempt 
the policy development cycle from 2011-2012 was implemented and a carbon tax 
transitioning to an ETS was implemented from 2012-2014 only to be killed off following a 
general election and change of government in 2013 (see Freebairn, 2014; Wild et al 2015).  
Three further attempts have since been initiated; an Emissions Intensity Scheme in 2016 (see 
Simshauser & Tiernan, 2018), a Clean Energy Target in 2017 (see Finkel, 2017; Simshauser 
2018) and a National Energy Guarantee from 2018 with this latter policy development cycle 
still on-foot with tentative bi-partisan support (see ESB, 2018).   
 
Adding to the seven attempts at a national ETS, at the sub-national level two schemes were 
legislated and operationalised in Queensland and New South Wales from the early 2000s to 
2012 due to the absence of an integrated national framework.  Both schemes were closed to 
avoid duplication with Australia’s Carbon Tax in 2012, and could not be practically revived 
when the Carbon Tax policy was shut down in 201419 (see Jones 2009; Daly and Edis; 2010; 
Nelson, 2015; Simshauser, 2018).  
 
Adding to the policy uncertainty has been continuous change in Australia’s Renewable 
Energy Target (RET20).  The RET was the world’s first renewable energy portfolio standard 
and initially mandated an additional 2% of energy be produced from renewable sources 
following its announcement in 1997 (MacGill 2010; Buckman and Diesendorf 2010; Byrne et 
al. 2013; Forrest and MacGill, 2013; Cludius et al. 2014).21  Legislated in 200022 and 
commencing from 2001, the policy has since been subjected to six major legislative reviews 
and fundamentally altered on three occasions (Jones 2009; Nelson et al. 2013; Simshauser 
2018).  A review in 2006 recommended the 9500GWh scheme be expanded and lengthened 
(Jones 2009; Buckman and Diesendorf 2010; Daly and Edis 2010), in 2008 it was expanded 
to a 20% Target expressed as 45TWh (Nelson et al. 2010; Byrnes et al. 2013; Cludius et al. 
2014), was split into a small (4000 GWh) and large-scale (41TWh) scheme in 2010 due to 
design flaws (Nelson et al. 2013; Nelson 2015; Simshauser & Tiernan, 2018); and reduced 
from 41TWh to 33TWh in 2015 (see Simshauser, 2018). 
 
To summarise, there has been seven attempts at an ETS, while the RET has been reviewed six 
times and fundamentally altered on three occasions.  The climate change policy environment 
impacting Australia’s NEM has thus been discontinuous at best. 
 
3. The 2009-2015 build-up to energy market conditions in 2016/17 
The NEM formally commenced in 1998 although energy-only ‘gross pool’ markets operated 
in NEM sub-regions from as early as 1994.  Investment decisions for new capacity were, at 
that point, shifted from former state-owned monopoly Electricity Commissions to the market. 
 
3.1 The starting point: changing entry form - Merchant to Policy-Induced 
NEM plant entry from the late-1990s experienced two extremes; 1). excess entry of base plant 
in Queensland, and simultaneously 2). a risk of inadequate peaking plant entry in the 
Victorian region (i.e. temporal Resource Adequacy problem).  Over time, government 
enterprises and policy mechanisms began to play an increasing role in the type, and the 
timing, of new plant entry – the latter in response to Australia’s international CO2 emission 
reduction commitments at Kyoto and later, at the Paris Conference of the Parties.  There is no 
definitive point at which these conditions changed, but for the purposes of the subsequent 
analysis, 2004 is used as a transition phase in which CO2-related policy investments became 
                                                          
19 The Carbon Tax policy was abandoned by the Abbott Government, and at the time, the State Governments of both QLD and 
NSW were of the same political party.  In the case of QLD it is also fair to say that the Gas Electricity Certificate policy had run 
its course for reasons outlined in Section 4.2. 
20 To be clear, Australia’s RET is an “electricity” target, unlike the EU RES energy target. 
21 While Australia was the first country to introduce a Renewable Portfolio Standard mechanism, the concept was originally 
developed in the USA (see Buckman and Diesendorf 2010).  
22 The legislation giving effect to the RET is the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act (2000). 
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prominent and coincides with the demise of the canonical merchant power producer model 
discussed in Section 2.1.   
 
Figure 1 allocates NEM generation plant entry into two distinct timeframes – pre- and post-
2004 – and split between two entry forms, viz. “Merchant” private investment and 
“Government / Policy-Induced”.  These latter generators sell their output into the spot 
electricity market in the same was as Merchant but by contrast, have some form of 
government involvement, either implicit backing – i.e. investments committed by government 
trading enterprises by way of balance sheet (as distinct from project-) financing, or in most 
instances, investments by private sector participants which access tradeable certificates in a 
“side-market”.23  
 NEM plant investment– Merchant vs. Government / Policy-induced24 
 
Source:  esaa, AEC. 
 
Notice that over the period 1996-2003, almost 6000MW of generation plant entry was 
Merchant.  Large capital commitments ($6+ billion) were made in response to perceived 
supply-side opportunities and the strength of forward price signals.  The risk of investment 
error was allocated appropriately – to the owners of the merchant generator.  Notice also that 
in the 1996-2003 period, Government / Policy-Induced entry was relatively small and 
primarily a response to the 2% Mandated Renewable Energy Target along with some State-
sanctioned Power Purchase Agreements on the grounds of Resource Adequacy risks in a 
newly forming market.  The 2004-2016 timeframe exhibits a reversal of entry form – policy 
inducement became a dominant driver of investment.  More than 9000MW of plant was 
committed whereas pure merchant entry was less than 2000MW.   
 
3.2 Rising plant stock imbalances 
Like many markets around the world experimenting with what Pollitt & Anaya (2016) 
describe as ‘game changing polices’ to reduce CO2 emissions, policy-induced entry resulted 
in a steadily rising structural oversupply and in some regions the emergence of the so-called 
merit-order effect.  The policy-induced entry form became prominent from 2010 and would 
weigh heavily on industry fundamentals. 
 
                                                          
23 Side markets include Renewable Energy Certificates under Australia’s 20% Renewable Energy Target and other state based 
schemes, and in some instances direct government contracts structured either as a Power Purchase Agreement or more recently, 
as Contracts-for-Differences.  See Simshauser & Tiernan (2018). 
24 In the period 2004-2016, Government / Policy-Induced plant comprised about 5100MW of conventional plant (dominated by 
gas-fired generation plant associated with Queensland’s Gas Electricity Certificate Scheme), and 4100MW of renewables in 
response to the RET.   
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 NEM Optimal Plant Mix vs Actual Plant Mix in 2010 
 
Simshauser (2010) 
 
Table 1 analyses the NEM’s 2010 supply-side balance relative to load given the then system-
wide maximum demand of 35700MW and energy demand of 200TWh.  In a security-
constrained dispatch model, the “Optimal” plant stock was determined as 25000MW of base, 
3600MW of intermediate and 10700MW of peak duty plant.  Additionally, to meet RET 
policy objectives, about 985MW of renewable plant was required.  The “Actual” column 
shows the incumbent fleet of generators, which exceeded “Optimal” by +7115MW.  Notice 
that oversupply comprised the more capital-intensive base and intermediate duty plant, and 
thus the capital stock was +$9,339.1 million overweight just as the RET policy was 
dramatically increased from 2% to 20%.   
 
3.3 Electricity load growth contracts (the first time in 120 years) 
Like many jurisdictions around the world, the Australian power industry can be traced back to 
the late-1800s.  From first power on 9 December 1882, where 8 arc lamps lit up along Queen 
Street in Brisbane, through to 2010 by which time the 5-region NEM represented one of the 
largest geographically interconnected grids in the world, the power system experienced 
positive Year-on-Year load growth.  Like most OECD economies NEM growth rates had 
been slowing from the 1950s onwards.  But in 2010, final electricity demand contracted 
(Figure 2). 
 Final electricity demand (NEM Regions) 1990-2016 and 2010-2015 forecasts  
(net of rooftop Solar PV) 
 
 
Source:  esaa, AEC, AEMO. 
 
Figure 2 includes central load forecasts undertaken from 2010-2015 – it took some time for 
industry to moderate forward growth expectations. 
 
Operating Duty Optimal Actual Imbalance Weighting
 (Peak load: 35,700 MW) (MW) (MW) (MW)
Base load plant 25,000 29,000 4,000 Overweight
Intermediate 3,600 6,000 2,400 Overweight
Peak load plant 10,700 10,200 -500 Underweight
Renewables 985 2,200 1,215 Overweight
Aggregate Supply 40,285 47,400 7,115 Oversupplied 
Capital stock $45,909.70 $55,248.80 $9,339.10 Overcapitalised
Source:  Simshauser (2010)
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3.4 Policy-induced entry into an oversupplied market with contracting demand 
Under Australia’s 2% renewable energy portfolio standard or RET, qualifying renewable 
generators could produce a Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) for each MWh they 
produced. Electricity retailers were allocated a set quantity of RECs to purchase each year and 
failure to do so was met with a non tax-deductible penalty price of $40/REC or $57/REC after 
adjusting for corporate taxes (Jones, 2009; Nelson et al. 2013).25  As Section 2.2 explained, 
from 2009 the RET policy was greatly expanded from 2% to 20%.  To support the policy 
objective the REC penalty price was raised to $65 or $92/REC after adjusting for taxation.26   
 
The investment outlook for renewable plant increased sharply as a result.  Figure 3, 
reproduced from Simshauser (2010), shows two forecasts for plant entry – in 2006 under the 
2% RET, and in 2009 after the 20% RET was legislated.  Note the expectation in the Policy-
Induced entry form, from 1200MW to 9500MW.  When the 20% RET (or 45TWh target) was 
devised during the 2-year period leading up to the 2009 legislation, load forecasts anticipated 
Year-on-Year load growth of 2.3% (per Figure 2).  By the time investment commitments 
were to be made, new plant would enter a market already oversupplied, and a market where 
load was now contracting for the first time.  
 Impact of expanded RET policy on forward investment plans 
 
Source: Simshauser (2010) 
 
3.5 Compounding matters: large discoveries of cost coal seam gas 
Throughout the period in which excess generation capacity was beginning to accumulate, and 
at a time when Australian final electricity demand was contracting for the first time on record, 
and in parallel with the expanded RET, discoveries of Proven & Probable (2P) coal seam gas 
reserves began to rise, sharply, as illustrated in Figure 4.   
  
                                                          
25 The opportunity cost of the MRET penalty incorporating the taxation rate of 30% was $57.14, i.e. ($40/0.7). 
26 The legislation was the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2009.  Around the same time, the Renewable Energy 
Directive (mandating the EU15 achieve 20% renewable energy production by 2020) also entered into force (see Jaraite et al. 
2017). 
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 Build-up of ‘Proven & Probable’ coal seam gas reserves – 2005-2013 
 
Source:  Simshauser & Nelson 2015 
 
The sheer size of these reserves relative to final east coast gas demand of about 700PJ per 
annum lead to a monetisation dilemma.  Growth in gas demand faced challenges in the short 
run; climate change policy wars meant no clear path existed for gas generation to enter 
profitably because CCGT plant, even with ultra-low cost Coal Seam Gas (circa $2.50/GJ), 
faced brutal competition from some of the lowest cost coal-fired generators in the world; the 
NEM’s black and brown coal fleet had marginal running costs of US$3 - US$10/MWh and 
average total costs of US$30/MWh.27  Consequently, by 2011 the roughly 50,000PJ of 2P 
reserves would take more than 70 years to monetise absent some other channel-to-market.28 
 
Over the period 2008-2012, three of the major gas producers on Australia’s east coast (Shell, 
Santos and Origin Energy) developed plans for LNG export terminals, each comprising 
roughly 2 x 250PJ/a plants.  The general view was that some consolidation and rationalisation 
would ultimately occur because if all three projects were to proceed, they would add 1500 
PJ/a to Australian east coast gas market final demand of 700PJ/a.  The commitment of the 6 x 
250 PJ/a LNG trains nonetheless occurred, and would have vital short- and long-run 
implications for the NEM; in the short run during the period leading up to LNG plant 
commissioning a certain amount of coal seam gas (i.e. LNG ramp gas) would be temporarily 
diverted to the NEM’s gas turbine fleet.  This led to a transient doubling of gas-fired 
generation output, from an historic market share of 6% to 13%, or 13,300GWh pa to almost 
26,000GWh per annum (Figure 5) thus further compounding structural oversupply.   
  
                                                          
27 AUD/USD = 0.75 
28 That is, 50,000PJ/700PJ = 71 years. 
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 Gas-fired generation 
 
Source: esaa, AEC 
 
The longer-term implications are dealt with later, in Section 4.2. 
 
3.6 Rooftop Solar PV at world record take-up rates 
Wholesale market conditions were further weighed down by the rapid take-up in rooftop solar 
PV.  In the QLD and SA NEM regions, installation rates were at world record levels on a per 
capita basis with 3 in 10 detached households installing rooftop PV systems – and given the 
size of the Australian housing stock (i.e. marginal housing stock is the second largest in the 
world at an average 240m2), marginal installations are typically 5+kW per household.  In 
some distribution network areas, this had the effect of producing the equivalent of the 
Californian Duck Curve via rooftop PV (rather than utility-scale) as Figure 6 illustrates.   
 Impact of rooftop solar PV with take-up rates rising to 3 in 10 detached homes 
(Southeast Queensland Distribution Network load) 
 
Source: Energex. 
 
3.7 Wholesale prices fall 
The impacts of structural oversupply, contracting power system demand, the policy-induced 
entry form, the build-up of 2P gas reserves & transient surge in gas-fired generation and 
world-record levels of rooftop solar PV, collectively placed considerable downward pressure 
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on wholesale electricity prices.  NEM spot prices (1999-2015, nominal dollars) are presented 
in Figure 7 and compared to 1). an estimated Average Total Cost (ATC) of the coal-fired fleet 
and 2). new entrant costs as represented by coal plant (1999-2005) and combined cycle gas 
turbine plant (2006-2018). 
 Nominal spot market prices vs Average Total Cost (Incumbent Coal Plant) 
 
Source:  AEMO, Simshauser (2014).  
 
3.8 The missing money  
By combining annual spot price and ATC data from Figure 8 with annual generation data for 
coal and gas-fired generation29, the quantum of missing money over the 2009-2015 period can 
be estimated (see Table 2).  To be sure, Table 2 excludes Ancillary Services revenues 
(although over this period comprised < 0.5% of system revenues) and any contract premiums 
– which might add c.5-10%  in revenues. These limitations aside, the missing money are    
c. $11.933 billion.  The NEM’s coal and gas-fired generation fleet peaked in 2011 at 
36500MW, comprising 28150MW of coal and 8500MW of gas plant.   The missing money 
for each 1000MW of incumbent capacity was at least $300 million over the period 2009-2015 
as Table 2 notes.   
 
 Calculation of missing money for coal and gas-fired generation plant 
 
Source: aemo, esaa, Simshauser (2014). 
 
3.9 Combining maintenance cutbacks with aging plant  
Like most other power systems amongst OECD countries, the NEM’s thermal (i.e. excluding 
gas turbine) fleet is aging. Entry is now dominated by renewable plant and specifically solar 
and wind.  Figure 8 illustrates the age of the NEM’s 26,872MW thermal plant stock.  The 
majority (ca.20,000MW) of the fleet was planned and constructed by State Electricity 
Commissions, with engineering design lives of ca.200,000 hours of operation (about 25 years 
of production duties).  Of course, most of these machines will have an economic life of 40-50 
years – Table 3 later reveals the practical evidence.  But the significance of Figure 8 is to 
                                                          
29 In this calculation, annual generation output was reduced by 7% for auxiliary load and a further 5% for transmission losses. 
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2009 43.30 39.11 -4.19 197,380.7 -0.730
2010 44.23 39.46 -4.76 192,848.5 -0.812
2011 45.18 31.96 -13.22 187,438.1 -2.190
2012 46.15 28.83 -17.32 184,892.2 -2.829
2013 47.14 37.81 -9.33 173,965.5 -1.435
2014 48.16 31.53 -16.62 168,160.4 -2.470
2015 49.19 39.60 -9.59 173,369.7 -1.469
Total 46.09 35.52 -10.57 -11.933
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highlight that 75% of the NEM’s thermal plant stock has already surpassed original 
engineering design lives.  If such plant are to maintain high levels of availability, then 
maintenance expenditure will need to increase, not reduce.   
 Cumulative age of the NEM’s Thermal Fleet  
 
Source:  ESAA, AEC. 
 
But a predictable outcome in the presence of mounting economic losses (Table 2) is a 
reduction in planned maintenance expenditures.30  With maintenance spending cutbacks, plant 
availability rates would begin to deteriorate in line with the rise in missing money as Figure 9 
illustrates.  This is an economic result, but one that would have implications in 2016/17. 
 NEM power station fleet availability from 1997/98 to 2015/16 
 
Source:  esaa, AEC. 
 
3.10 The C&I Customer Setup 
This culmination of events, including gyrations in the market for natural gas and the political 
market for climate change policy initiatives seemingly led C&I Customers to alter their 
electricity purchasing practices.  Presumably driven by internal procurement teams rather than 
                                                          
30 By way of simple example, in 2011 the 2000MW Loy Yang Power Station in Victoria’s La Trobe Valley delayed an otherwise 
scheduled statutory overhaul by 12-18 months in order to maintain cash flows in the intervening period.  The author was 
Chairman of Loy Yang from 2009-2011.     
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treasury teams, contract durations immediately prior to looming price spikes visibly shorten 
as Figure 10 illustrates.  This shortening was material – the average C&I contract tenor had 
progressively reduced from an average of 38+ months to just 22 months by the end of the data 
series.  This would setup C&I customers for maximum commodity price exposure to any 
upward cycle due the speed of C&I forward purchase maturities.   
 NEM average C&I contract tenor: 2006-2016 term-to-maturity 
 
Source: EnergyAction31 
 
By the 2014/15 financial year, NEM power system conditions and the supply-demand 
imbalances had reached their nadir.  From this point, conditions would start to reverse rapidly.  
Spot and forward prices would then surge to record levels following a series of sudden 
shocks.  For C&I Customers, shortening contract tenor risk would then vest with full force, 
from 2016/17. 
 
4. 2016/17: exit, LNG entry and renewable policy uncertainty  
Mounting economic losses (Table 2) meant certain coal generators would hit natural limits to 
cost cutting and thus exit would become the dominant strategy.  Trying to predict the timing 
of coal plant exit is a thankless task.  Tipping points driving exit decisions seem to correlate 
with large capital re-investment requirements rather than a simple episode of short run 
revenues failing to cover short run cost.  Furthermore, exit decisions are complicated by 
multiple considerations including 1). immediate losses of uncertain near-term spot market 
revenues; 2). the risk of first mover disadvantage; and 3). the compounding penalty of 
enormous site rehabilitation costs associated with a coal plant closure decision.  
Consequently, Australian literature and policy inquiry began to canvas coal plant barriers to 
exit in the NEM (see for example Nelson, Reid & McNeill, 2015; Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015; 
Parliament of Australia, 2016).  Ultimately, what occurred was an uncoordinated exit 
procession that exceeded market expectation.32 
 
It is difficult to define the pivotal moment, but the NEM cycled from record low- to record 
high-prices over the 2014 (low) to 2017 (high) period, starting with the announced closures of 
major coal-fired generators in the Southern NEM regions, sharply rising gas prices, and the 
                                                          
31 Based on approximately 5000 C&I customers.  Thanks to Michael Fahey (EnergyAction) for providing this data. 
32 A number of industry professionals have said to this author that the NEM coal plant exit decisions that occurred were 
predictable.  I note that their observations were made ‘ex post’!  While some of the closures were predictable, I certainly did not 
anticipate the speed, nor the extent, of the NEM plant closures that ultimately transpired.  The practical evidence presented in 
Section 4 is that the market did not either. 
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delayed entry of renewables:  Figure 11 extends Figure 7 to illustrate the run-up in spot prices 
from 2H 2015/16. 
 Spot market prices vs generator costs 1999-2018 
 
Source: AEMO, ABS, Simshauser (2014) 
 
4.1 Uncoordinated coal plant exit  
From 2012, aging coal plants began exiting the NEM.  Initial closures were benign events; 
plant exits were small relative to total region oversupply, had operated at comparatively low 
utilisation rates, or had already been mothballed and thus had little impact on spot market 
prices as Figure 11 indicates.  But two plant exits during 2016-2017 in the southern regions of 
the NEM were material, occurred with little warning and were uncoordinated.  Table 3 sets 
out the NEM coal plant closures from 2012-2017 and notes that 11 coal plants with 5156MW 
of capacity exited the market with a capacity-weighted average warning period of 5.2 months.    
 
 NEM coal plant exit 
 
 
The 540MW Northern Power Station, the last coal-fired plant in the NEM’s SA Region, 
announced it would close in mid-2016.  The plant had a declining coal resource but more 
importantly was forced to compete with a large wind fleet, navigate weather-driven merit-
order effects and a C&I customer base who, ironically, seemed to prefer taking spot 
exposures than sign medium-term supply agreements with the generator.  With spot revenues 
declining and plant costs rising (falling availability and utilisation) closure became the 
dominant strategy.  The significance of its closure was underestimated - not from a spot 
market or system reliability perspective, but from a contract market perspective (see 
Simshauser, 2018b).  SA is a small imperfectly interconnected NEM region with a peak load 
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Spot Price
($/MWh)
NEM Spot Price
NEM Spot Price (carbon Incl)
ATC
LRMC
Carbon tax 
$23/t
Coal Plant
Capacity 
(MW)
NEM 
Region
Exit   
(Year)
Enter   
(Year)
Age at Exit 
(Years)
Warning 
(Months)
Notice 
Date
Closure 
Date
Swanbank B 500 Qld 2012 1972 40 23.6 26-Mar-10 27-Mar-12
Playford*# 240 SA 2012 1960 52 6.9 7-Oct-15 8-May-16
Collinsville 180 Qld 2013 1972 41 5.9 1-Jun-12 1-Dec-12
Munmorah~ 600 NSW 2013 1969 44 0.0 3-Jul-12 3-Jul-12
Morwell 195 Vic 2014 1958 56 1.0 29-Jul-14 30-Aug-14
Wallerawang~ 1000 NSW 2014 1978 36 0.0 1-Nov-14 1-Nov-14
Redbank 151 NSW 2015 2001 14 0.0 31-Oct-14 31-Oct-14
Anglesea 150 Vic 2016 1969 47 3.6 12-May-15 31-Aug-15
Northern# 540 SA 2016 1985 31 6.9 7-Oct-15 8-May-16
Hazelwood 1600 Vic 2017 1967 50 4.8 3-Nov-16 1-Apr-17
 Total / Average 5156 1972 42.5 5.2
* Mothballed in 2012
# Original notice 11 June 2015 with planned closure date of March 2018
~ Mothballed, Notice was therefore immediate
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of 3100MW and an underlying base load of 1200MW33.  Thus the exit of a 540MW base load 
plant would extract a very material component of SA’s primary supply of base load hedge 
contracts – and in their place were run-of-plant Wind Power Purchase Agreements – far from 
a perfect substitute.  And as Section 4.2 later reveals, immediately preceding this a CCGT 
plant partially mothballed its capacity to on-sell gas to LNG export markets.  Forward prices 
jumped and crucially, hedge contract liquidity contracted.  Over the ensuing 12-month period 
the SA power system would experience multiple blackouts and a black system event in 
September 2016.   
 
Two months later, the 1600MW Hazelwood Power Station in the adjacent VIC Region 
announced it would close in mid-2017.  The closure arose due to mounting long-dated capital 
re-investment requirements ($400 million34) relating to plant safety.  Hazelwood supplied 
more than 20% of the VIC region, and was thus also a material and coincident plant exit. 
 
Northern Power Station is an example of first mover disadvantage.  While Northern would 
eventually exit the market due to declining coal resources, it is not obvious that April 2016 
was the optimal closure date given Hazelwood’s imminent, but unknown, exit timing.    
 
4.2 LNG entry & CCGT withdrawal 
Figure 6 noted gas-fired generation output increased by more than 90%, from 13300GWh in 
2006 to almost 26,000GWh in 2014.  The 2014 final gas demand on the east coast network 
was 700PJ/a with gas used in power generation representing about 215 PJ/a or 30% of the 
aggregate.35  The east coast’s gas supply and demand had taken nearly 50 years reach these 
levels.  During the two-year period 2014-2016, gas demand would triple to 2000PJ/a 
following the commissioning of three LNG terminals.  Details of the LNG terminals are 
presented in Table 4 and Figure 12 provides historic and forecast final gas demand for 
context. 
 
 Queensland LNG Plant  
 
 
  
                                                          
33 Calculations are based on 2017 SA load data, viz. peak demand of 3059MW and energy demand of 12607GWh.  Base load 
duties have been defined at the 82nd percentile of load given coal plant marginal running costs of $15/MWh and Average Total 
Cost of $55/MWh, and CCGT plant marginal running costs of $55/MWh and Average Total Cost of $88/MWh. 
34 For details on the Hazelwood re-investment dilemma see http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-01/worksafe-notices-detail-
extent-of-repairs-needed-at-hazelwood/8082318.  
35 Commercial & Industrial gas consumption was 290PJ/a, and residential use was 180PJ/a (Simshauser & Nelson, 2015). 
LNG 
Project
Domestic 
Proponent
Project 
Commitment 
Date
Nameplate 
Capacity 
(PJ/a)
Maximum 
Capacity 
(PJ/a)
Contracted 
Supply 
(PJ/a)
Comissioning 
Date Train 1
Comissioning 
Date Train 2
Investment 
Commitment
QCLNG Shell 30-Oct-10 504 549 474 28-Dec-14 5-Jul-15 USD 19.8b
APLNG Origin Energy 04-Jul-12* 534 575 510 2-Jan-16 6-Oct-16 USD 24.7b
GLNG Santos 13-Jan-11 463 498 427 27-Sep-15 25-May-16 USD 18.0 b
TOTAL 1500 1622 1411
*APLNG Train 1 was committed on 28 July 2011.  Source:  Simshauser (2018), Grafton et al. (2018)
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 Daily final gas demand 2012-2013 and Forecast gas demand 2014-2018 
 
Source:  Simshauser & Nelson (2015). 
 
In my opinion, it would be unusual for any mature energy market to experience a three-fold 
change in demand within a two-year window, and do so smoothly.  Just as final gas demand 
was set to treble constraints emerged on the supply-side – three36 of five NEM jurisdictional 
governments and the neighbouring Northern Territory government placed a moratorium on 
on-shore coal seam gas ‘fracking’.  Furthermore, just as the LNG terminals were 
commissioning the oil price collapsed which adversely affected the economics of marginal 
gas supplies.  Boreholes drilled, the lead indicator of future supply, contracted sharply (see 
Appendix II). 
 
The entry of the three LNG terminals would therefore completely upend eastern Australian 
gas market dynamics on a sustained basis (i.e. medium- to long-term planning horizon) for 
three primary reasons;  
 
1. Because LNG entry exceeded supply, a certain amount of gas used in the domestic 
market would be suddenly re-diverted to LNG export plants to meet certain ‘point-to-
point contract’ export commitments (Grafton et al. 2018).  Gas-fired generation 
peaked over the 2013-2014 period at around 215PJ/a annum.  Once LNG Plant began 
their commissioning cycle, gas used in power generation contracted to 169PJ/a, with 
semi-base load gas generation reducing from 115PJ/a over the 2013-2014 period to 
72PJ/a (down 37%) over the 2016-2017 period (see Figure 13).  This contraction in 
base load gas generation output coincided with the exit of the base load Northern and 
Hazelwood coal-fired power stations.    
  
                                                          
36 NSW, VIC and TAS. 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Aggregate Gas Demand 
(TJ/d)
Residential & SME
Commercial & Industrial
Power Generation
LNG Train6
LNG Train5
LNG Train4
LNG Train3
LNG Train2
LNG Train1Residential 
and SME 
Commercial 
& Industrial
Power 
Generation
 Page 17 
 Gas used in gas-fired power generation (2009-2017) 
 
Source: EnergyEdge GMAT. 
 
2. Australia’s historically low and stable gas prices of $3 - $4/GJ would suddenly link to 
LNG-netback prices (see shaded area in Figure 14) with forward gas supply contract 
offers and deals evidently trading from $8 - $12+/GJ as Figure 14 illustrates. 
 Australian East Coast Spot and Contract Gas Prices (2010-2018) 
 
Source: GMAT, ACCC (2018). 
 
3. It had become clear that 3 LNG projects (comprising 6 individual trains, per Table 4) 
represented excess entry and in consequence the gas market would emerge at the end 
of the LNG commissioning cycle in an elongated state of supply-scarcity as Figure 15 
illustrated.  As Simshauser & Nelson (2015) explained, the gas market was capable of 
supporting 4 x 250PJ LNG trains, possibly 5.  6 trains was an excess entry result.   
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 LNG Plant Capacity vs Production 
 
Source: GMAT. 
 
A striking feature of the 2016/17 electricity price cycle was the complete absence of gas 
turbine proposals, let alone entry.  Gas plant entry was subject to critical hold-up.  The NEM 
has had prior episodes of high spot electricity (viz. 2007-2008) driven by Australia’s 
millennium drought.37  During that price cycle, more than 5000MW of gas-fired generation 
plant entered the coal-dominated NEM (see Figure 16).  In the current cycle, prices have risen 
to much higher levels but rather than entering, semi-base gas-fired generators opted to on-sell 
long-dated gas supplies to the chronically short LNG export industry during the low spot 
electricity price periods in 2014-2015 – not knowing that uncoordinated coal plant exits were 
imminent.  Two CCGT plants were, therefore, mothballed in 2015/16.  When the Northern 
and Hazelwood coal plant suddenly exited, CCGT plant struggled to re-enter the market 
because gas prices had surged beyond economic levels (see Figure 14).   
 Gas fired plant entry, and mothballing 
 
Source: esaa, AEC, AEMO. 
 
                                                          
37 During 2007-2008, hydro plant were severely curtailed and in QLD coal plant were forced to mothball due to critical water 
shortages in dams where coal plant shared with drinking water supplies.   
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4.3 VRE entry lags 
Coal plant exit was driven by missing money and the market outlook, viz. contracting 
demand, expectations of a large policy-induced fleet of VRE plant entry via the 20% 
Renewable Energy Target (RET) and the other factors outlined earlier.  However, the 
anticipated VRE plant entry experienced non-trivial delay through policy discontinuity.  
Section 2.2 noted the RET had been the subject of six major reviews.  Figure 17 illustrates the 
series of political events and their impact on the prevailing price of Renewable Energy 
Certificates. 
 REC Spot Prices (2001-2017) 
 
Source: Simshauser (2018) 
 
In 2013 a general election produced a change in the Commonwealth Government, from social 
democrat Labor to the conservative Liberal/National Coalition.  The incoming Abbott 
Government commissioned yet another (non-scheduled) fundamental review of the RET 
(‘Warburton Review38’) in February 2014 – the 6th major review of the policy. However, on 
this occasion the implications were more significant; the Warburton Review’s four-person 
expert panel comprised four highly regarded business people, three of which were outspoken 
on adverse effects of carbon pricing and RET policies.  This set a certain tone as to the likely 
direction of the policy review within the industry. With the RET fixed at 41TWh and 
contracting demand, the 20% target was beginning to look closer to 25-30%.  This was the 
narrative adopted when the Review Panel was initiated (Byrne et al. 2013; Nelson, 2015).   
Consequently, from the moment the panel inquiry and its members were announced, an 
investment freeze emerged (see Figure 18).  The Warburton review released their report on 28 
August 2014 and recommended either closing the scheme to entrants, or a variable 20% target 
(which would equate to 26TWh, a 15TWh reduction from the 41TWh target).   
 
From 2014-2015 wholesale electricity prices were ca.$39/MWh due to the overhang of 
capacity, and Renewable Energy Certificates traded below $30/REC given policy uncertainty.  
VRE entry costs had not experienced their more recent rapid downward trajectory (which 
occurred from 2016 onwards, see Figure 18).  Consequently, with wind projects still > 
$80/MWh and solar PV projects $100+/MWh, investment conditions for VRE had become 
intractable.  For VRE plant to have any moderating effect on the looming and uncoordinated 
coal plant exits and gas plant withdrawals, it was during this period that investment 
commitment needed to occur due to construction lags.  But as Figure 18 illustrates, a distinct 
slowdown in investment commitments occurred during FY14-FY16. 
                                                          
38 Warburton Review available at http://apo.org.au/system/files/41058/apo-nid41058-82456.pdf  
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 Investment in RET 
 
 
Source BNEF, ABS. 
 
Late in 2014, the major political parties commenced negotiations with the involvement of 
stakeholders, and a deal was done on 11 May 2015 to scale-back the 41TWh target to 
33TWh, with amendments to the RET legislation passed in 23 June 2015.  Project 
development activity was then re-initiated with commitments emerging 12 months later and 
accelerating in pace to record investment levels in FY17 and FY18, with most of this capacity 
set to enter in FY19 and FY20.  
 
4.4 Spot and forward prices  
The combination of uncoordinated coal plant exit, the commissioning of the LNG terminals, 
the scarcity of gas supply, declining gas-fired generation output and lagged entry of 
renewables sent spot and futures prices soaring by historic standards.39  Figure 18, which has 
two panels, summarises the evolution of prices by reference to Calendar Year 2018 (Cal-18) 
base load futures contract prices (LHS panel), and the forward price curve comprising 
Calendar Year 2019-2021 base load futures prices (RHS panel).  Note that the trading range 
of the Cal-18 instrument was $35-$50/MWh in the period leading up to the NEM’s crisis 
period of 2016/17, whereas the Cal-21 trading range is $60-$85/MWh – the primary 
difference being the change in the plant mix, underpinned by the profound changes to the 
market for natural gas. 
  
                                                          
39 Adding to the NEMs problems were the ability of remaining coal plant to shadow price the (dramatically) higher marginal 
running costs of the OCGT plants setting prices, and in the Queensland region, the unexpected but blatant market power abuse 
by, ironically, a state-owned generator – with tacit supporting behaviour amongst other public and private generators. 
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 2018 Futures Contracts and 2018 Forward Curve 
 
Source:  GFI. 
 
5. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks 
In May 2018, the front page of The Australian newspaper reported a Newspoll survey of 
voters on which federal party, social democratic Labor or conservative Liberal/National, 
would best manage energy supply and lower energy prices40.  That such a poll occurred at all 
is of concern.  When electricity supply persistently makes headlines of national newspapers, 
the policy that follows will rarely be well considered as Simshauser & Tiernan (2018) 
explain.   
 
Given the benefit of hindsight, what can be learned from such a mess?  It is worth 
distinguishing problems from properly functioning markets.  The NEM’s spot and contract 
markets have operated faithfully41 throughout the 2016/2017 period in that prices reflected 
scarcity.  The signals, while acute, led to a large supply-side response; by the end of the 
2017/18 financial year, Australia’s Clean Energy Regulator had recorded 5249MW42 of VRE 
committed and under construction with a further 800MW proceeding to financial close.  
Additionally, the black system event in South Australia, while extraordinary, was a security 
issue, not a reliability issue, and not one that warrants anything beyond a review of system 
operations and the dispatch quantities of Frequency Control Ancillary Services given a 
rapidly changing plant mix.43   
 
The NEM’s three material policy problems are (i) dealing with uncoordinated plant exit at 
scale, (ii) climate change policy discontinuity and its impact on investment timing, and the 
(iii) the general state of the gas market. 
 
5.1 Uncoordinated Exit 
When the NEM (and other energy markets like it) was designed load growth was significant 
and considerable thought went into plant entry.  In the Australian case at least, it is not 
obvious that plant exit and the post-exit market environment were given much consideration 
at all because barriers to entry were largely dismantled.  In practice, exit decisions at scale are 
                                                          
40 See “PM’s energy plan fails with voters”, The Australian, 29 May 2018, Page 1.  The National Affairs Editor (Simon Benson) 
of The Australian was the author. 
41 Notwithstanding one episode of economic withholding by one generator (see Wood & Blowers, 2018), which in turn was dealt 
with by policymakers.  
42 Data available at http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/RET/About-the-Renewable-Energy-Target/Large-scale-Renewable-
Energy-Target-market-data#progress  
43 The distinction here is nuanced but critical. It is beyond the scope of this article to review the details of the system collapse, 
suffice to acknowledge two key issues, 1). Resource Adequacy was not an underlying problem per se in that adequate plant 
capacity existed, and 2). system operation was suboptimal in that the dispatch of Frequency Control Ancillary Services was 
insufficient and interconnectors overloaded given the mix of plant available and known volatile weather conditions approaching 
the region. 
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uncoordinated for anti-trust reasons, and they have occurred with little warning as Table 3 
explained.  Uncoordinated and sudden exit at scale produces transient market imbalances and 
in the NEM raised prices sharply.  In most other markets, exit effects are driven by plant 
entry, and smoothed by inventories and demand bids.  In the case of electricity, demand 
response has been imperfect and the supply-side is largely inelastic in the short run. 
 
As an energy-only market, there is no centrally contracted capacity in the NEM.  A Medium 
Term Projected Assessment of System Adequacy (two-years ahead, weekly resolution) 
provides information on aggregate supply and forecast demand, but ultimately it is non-
binding on participants.  The initial response from policymakers on advice from the Finkel 
Review (2017) was to introduce a Three-Year Closure Rule (the Rule Change was under 
active consideration at the time of writing). This rule would require all power stations above a 
certain size to nominate their expected closure date to the system operator, and to update any 
change to this expected closure date immediately (in a manner consistent with the listing 
conventions and public disclosures associated with stock exchanges). 
 
This is an entirely sensible policy suggestion.  The intent of the NEM’s proposed Rule 
Change is to make this disclosure a legally binding obligation, which raises at least two 
problems;  (i) Company Directors have fiduciary duties to not trade while insolvent, and (ii) 
Company Directors also have fiduciary duties to not endanger the lives of employees, and 
clearly with a 40+ year old piece of mechanical and electrical equipment, this cannot be 
guaranteed three years ahead without occasionally triggering (i) due to extensive capital re-
investment required.  The Hazelwood example, requiring $400 million of reinvestment, is a 
case in point.   
 
Would a capacity market alter this dynamic?  Perhaps.  But it is worth bearing in mind that 
most power stations in Table 3 would have had a portfolio of forward contracts in place at the 
time the Board of Directors decided to close the plant, and unwinding these contracts must 
follow any closure announcement otherwise traders are in breach of Australia’s “insider 
trading” laws.  And so exit at scale necessarily involves the costly unwinding of forward 
hedge contracts.  Furthermore, as one reviewer pointed out – the first capacity auctions in 
Great Britain saw a successful CCGT bid fail to enter with the proponents treating the 
capacity contract as a form of option – and writing off its credit support costs – and an 
existing coal generator withdrew from a 1-year capacity contact it had previously banked.  
Ultimately, the combination of (i) and (ii) must surely explain the extraordinary speed of exit 
of many of the coal plant listed in Table 3 in spite of their forward contract positions.   
 
If publishing expected coal plant closure dates “in good faith” is as much as can be 
reasonably expected due to Directors liabilities, then the policy gap that needs to be 
considered is how to moderate the impacts of exit at scale.  Forward prices six months prior to 
the closure of Hazelwood Power Station in VIC were $41.38/MWh (Apr-2016).  Forward 
prices rose to $112.07/MWh (Apr-2017) in the month following plant exit – with the entire 8 
x 200MW plant exiting over the course of 6 consecutive trading days.  The consumer impact 
of this price change equates to $3.27 billion in a single year given VIC generation output of 
45,250GWh.44  If the Hazelwood plant required $400 million re-investment but cannot be 
justified by the firm, and region-wide economic impacts in a single year are multiples of the 
reinvestment hurdle, then some policy mechanism to fund some fraction of this re-investment 
could be justified – not with an objective of prolonging a plant which should retire – but to 
ensure retirement occurs in an orderly fashion.  For example, in the Hazelwood case the 
closure of 4 units in 2017 followed by the closure of the remaining units in 2019 or 2020  
would have still produced a surge in prices (albeit not to the same extreme) and provided the 
supply-side with a reasonable response time.45 
 
                                                          
44 Prices in all NEM regions were materially impacted, and so NEM-wide (i.e. 180TWh load) consumer impacts are multiples of 
this figure.   
45 I have written elsewhere that entry times for permitted plant in the NEM including 6 months to reach financial close followed 
by the following construction periods:  1). 18 months for wind generation, 2). 9 months for solar PV, 3). 9 months for utility-
scale battery, and 4). 12 months for gas turbine plant. 
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5.2 Climate change policy discontinuity 
Australian academic literature is littered with research on the effects of policy discontinuity 
after the two decades long climate policy wars.  Policy discontinuity has sent mixed signals to 
utility and renewables investors and created boom-bust investment conditions as illustrated in 
Figures 17 and 18.  Within Australia’s federalist system of government, energy policy levers 
and their real-world implications are generally poorly understood by politicians due to (1) its 
sporadic relevance to prevailing political agendas, and (2) the sheer complexity of gross pool 
competitive energy-only markets.  Energy policy responsibility is at the State-level, and 
climate change policy is a Commonwealth responsibility.  There are at least a dozen 
Commonwealth politicians from the conservative side of politics who genuinely believe that 
what Australia is lacking is a new coal-fired generator.46   
 
At the time of writing an integrated energy and climate change policy, known as the National 
Energy Guarantee (NEG), was being pursued by the full-time politicians dedicated to 
understanding the NEM, viz. the State and Commonwealth Energy Ministers, with the intent 
being to enshrine the policy framework into the National Energy Rules (due to the inherent 
stability of the National Electricity Rules and the robust and non-politicised processes around 
rule changes).  The NEG policy requires retailers to progressively decarbonise their portfolios 
(Emissions Obligation), and maintain a level of physical or financial forward capacity 
(Reliability Obligation) at levels consistent with Australia’s Paris Agreement and the NEMs 
reliability criteria, respectively.  While the carbon targets will remain the subject of policy 
discontinuity at the Commonwealth level, the underlying Emissions and Reliability 
Obligations framework in the NEG can exhibit stability if it can be successfully absorbed by 
the National Electricity Rules, and this would mark a material step forward for the NEM. 
 
5.3 The market for natural gas 
Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but there is no doubting the excess LNG plant capacity built 
on Australia’s east coast both before, and after, the event.  It was predicted, and was 
predictable (see Garnaut, 2014; Simshauser & Nelson, 2015; Grafton et al, 2018). One of the 
three LNG terminals was known to be inherently short at project commitment.  Policy 
recommendations such as a “National Interest Test” to pre-screen the risk of excess LNG 
capacity may well have prevented the gas market shortages that now exist.  Domestic 
reservation policies which link export projects with certain domestic supply obligations may 
also provide a credible forward policy option and appear to work well for Australia’s west 
coast.  But such policy cannot be invoked retrospectively without raising genuine soverign 
risk – which has its own flow-on implications.  This also represented an area for further 
research. 
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